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The 70 1 s have witnessed a number of events which are again focussing 
attention of economists on international migration: the dramatic emergence of 
the Middle East labor markets is affecting the economies of the low income 
Middle Eastern nations and of South Asia on a large scale; the world recession 
with its associated unemployment in North America and Western Europe has stim-
ulated increased conservatism with regard to immigration policy; increasing 
tension in Southern Africa has raised interest in the continuing role of South 
Africa as a major employer of workers from neighboring countries; and the long-
standing rhetoric against the brain-drain from poorer nations has persisted. 
The present paper attempts to provide a synopsis of some of the economic 
issues pertinent to the consideration of these phenomena, and is organized into 
four main sections. Section I deliberates some of the causes of international 
migration, drawing in part on the literature on internal migration. Section II 
then proceeds to consider some of the economic consequences of international mi-
gration. This section is subdivided into ti;o parts: the first dealing with mi-
gration in promoting global and national productive efficiency -- a subject of 
much attention in economic theory; the second addressing some of the questions 
on international and internal distribution of incomes. Section III deals with 
l 
an area in which almost no literature exists: building on the results of the pre-
vious sections, a framework for considering cost-benefit evaluation studies of 
international migration is briefly outlined. Finally, the fourth section dis-
cusses s::,me of the policy instruments used today, or which might be adopted, 
for promoting, discouraging or changing the nature of international migration 
a discussion based on the summary of causes and consequences, and ultimately 
requiring some form of evaluation prior to implementation. 
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I. Causes 
M.igration is comparable to a flow of water or electricity -- an adjust-
ment flow responding to pressure differentials at opposite ends of the pipeline. 
This view suggest that it is neither the absolute level of push nor of pull fac-
tors which matters, but the existing difference in relative attraction elements. 
Within this scenario there remain, however, three major areas for debate: the 
appropriate form of the differentials -- absolute differences versus ratios; the 
list of variables whose differentials contribute to relative attractiveness of 
alternative locations; and the relative importance and interaction between these 
contributing factors. 
The economics literature on migration places considerable emphasis on the 
role of earnings differentials in influencing the decision to migrate. 1 There 
is considerable cross-sectional and some time-series evidence from various coun-
tries that internal migration occurs towards locations with higher average wages, 
and that earnings or wage differences play a "significant" role in influencing 
the size of the migration stream. Far less systematic evidence of this kind 
exists for international migration, but the work to date tends to support this 
view in an international contexto 2 Serious doubts exist, however, on the reli-
ability of the current approach to estimating the responsiveness of migration 
flows to changes in wage differentials. (a) Most aggregated migration flow func-
tions cannot be derived from micro behavioral responses of the underlying per-
sons (Lucas 1976); (b) Given the discrete nature of the migration decision, or-
dinary estimation techniques are inappropriate (Schultz 1976, Lucas 1976); (c) 
As we shall argue later, it is probably both true that migration rates depend 
1. See, for example, Greenwood (1975), Krugman and Bhagwati (1976), Todaro (1976), 
and Lucas (1977) for recent surveys, 
2. See Psacharopoulos (1976) and Lucas (1976). 
upon wage differences, and that w.age differences depend upon migration rates --
the two effects ought to be analyzed simultaneously (Muth 1971). 
Moreover, viewing average wages in alterative locations may be quite 
deceptive. In studying rural to urban migration in LDCs, it is common to find 
average wages far higher in the towns. But the towns often contain proportion~ 
ately more men and the average urban dweller has more education, and both being 
male and more educated raises wages within the urban and rural zones. Comparing 
individuals of given sex, education and age, could conceivably produce no dif-
ferences in wages available in urban and rural areas. Yet it is presumably the 
wage difference facing a given (type of) individual which influences the decision 
to migrate. Comparing averages across populations of very different demographic 
composition can be quite misleading. 
This latter point leads to a closely related problem. No one would claim 
that earnings opportunity is the only factor contributing to migration. What 
is important to some of the economic arguments later in the paper is only the 
tendency for workers to be drawn towards higher wage areas. Many other factors 
may contribute, and a frequently suggested candidate is education. On the whole, 
it does. seem that better educated people migrate more readily. Yet it may also 
be true that wage differences vary with the level of education, and few existing 
studies satisfactorily disentangle the extent to which this is a matter of 
attitude or of changing opportunity with education -- a significant distinction 
when addressing policy influence. 
Another factor frequently cited as influencing the flow of migrants is 
the state of unemployment. Thus, wages paid to those employed may be high but 
unemployment so great as to render this an unattractive alternative. Perhaps 
the principle variant on this is a simple view of random job assignment in 
each location, so that every worker receives over time a weighted average of 
the higl1 wage .. :i.rid of the low earnings associated with unemployment -- the so-
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called "expected wage" (Todaro 1969, Harris and Todaro 1970). 
Still further important contributory factors are brought out by the in-
vestment perspective on migration (Sjaastad 1962). The essential idea, here, 
is that migration is a costly undertaking, involving an initial sacrifice in 
return for a stream of higher earnings subsequent to movement. At least three 
elements of cost are commonly distinguished: travel costs, the costs of supporting 
oneself while seeking work in the new place, and "psychic" costs. The last is 
a catch-all concept often adopted by economists to reflect those attitudes 
playing the role of cost barriers yet involving no money or other "real" oppor-
tunity costs -- in this instance reflecting the distaste of separation from 
family and familiar surroundings. In empirical work, distance is frequently 
taken as a proxy for travel costs, psychic barriers, and the difficulty of ob-
taining accurate information over long distances (Schwartz 1973). Travel and 
settling-in costs clearly require monetary funding. If each person could borrow 
funds at the same interest cost, the financing problem would be equally onerous 
to all. But in fact the loss of interest on spent savings of the wealthy is 
normally lower than the interest payments necessary on loans for the poor. Thus, 
the hypothesis arises that the wealthy are (other things equal) more likely to 
undertake costly migration. Of course, settling-in costs may be ameliorated by 
the presence of friends or relatives in the destination -- both by lowering 
accomodation expense and by speeding the process of job-finding through contacts. 
Together with increased availability of information, this helps in understanding 
why particular streams of movement tend to be sustained from one village to a 
particular town, or from one country to anotner. Finally, since recoupment of 
the initial cost takes time in this investment model, individuals with a pros-
pect of a longer period for recoupment have greater incentive to relocate. Thus, 
in addition to a foot-loose attitude, some economic rationale is provided for the 
observed phenomenon of the tendency to greater migration amongst the young. 
So far, the stories of (expected) wage differences and of initial sacri-
fice to gain access would suggest migration in one direction. Yet, return mi-
gration~- particularly internationally -- is common. One plausible explanation 
of this resides in the nature of psychic costs. Unlike travel and settling-in 
costs, psychic.costs of separation may well persist. The migrant may then make 
an initial sacrifice, travel to a higher wage area and save. Once a sufficient 
or target level of savings is achieved, the migrant can afford to return to the 
odginal lower wage zone and enjoy discontinuation of the psychic costs. This 
"target saver" model is probably quite appropriate for many of Europe's guest 
workers and of migrants to the Middle East, amongst others. 
The above discussion draws extensively on ideas developed for migration 
generally, and there is nothing particularly international about it. But inter-
national migration does warrant the consideration of an entirely different as-
pect. In particular, the preceding pa.p.agraphs relate entirely to the decision 
to migrate -- the supply side. The demand side is represented only by wage and 
employment opportunitieso But in consideri.ng international migration, the de-
mand side is expressed also through quotas, visas and r.egulations on access ~-
a feature of internal migration apparent in only a few countries. Thus, factors 
influencing the desire to migrate, even given the difficulties of financing a 
shift, may nonetheless not translate into realized migration owing to demand 
side forces. In the empirical study of the causes of international migration 
this is not a minor difficulty. 
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Finally, if asked why they emigrated, many respondents would no doubt ~ite 
the movement of their spouse or other family members, and too many would certainly 
be ·designated refugees. The former do not of necessity deny the role of earnii,gs 
opportunities in determining the directions and magnitud~s offlows, provided the 
family as a whole is concerned with moving to a location offering higher family 
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joint-earning opportunities (Mincer 1978). On the otrier hand, altho.ugh refugees 
do not contradict the general principal of relative attractiveness in deciding 
to migrate, it seems likely that earnings possibilities generally play a far 
smaller role in either the decision to quit or the "choice" of refuge. In the 
case of refugees, the latte.r is all too often dictated entirely by demand side 
forces, as dramatically illustrated by the plight· of the Vietnamese boat-people. 
II.· Consequences 
This section considers some of the eco~omic consequences of international 
migration, first from the perspective of production efficiency and second with 
regard to the distribution of well-bei.ng. 
A) Efficiency 
a); The perfect market variant: domestic perspective 
As a reference point, if is useful to outline first what may be dubbed the 
perfect market story. The basis of this model is the presumption thac wo~kers 
and capitalists generally receive what their product is socially worth. Within 
this context, one may distinguish two major aspects: do"1estic efficiency and 
global efficiency. 
The assertion of the brain-drain a.rgument is that departure of skilled 
manpower reduces a country's ability to produce and hence reduces incomes in the 
country. At this juncture, it is important to emphasize two distinct foundations 
for consideri.ng this position. If it is true, as su.ggested in section I, that 
a cause of migration is economic opportunity and such opportunities a,e on aver-
.age correctly guessed, then migrants themselves :,re presumably made better off. 
. . 
However, the group remaining behind may be worse-off. In this case, from a "do-
mestic" perspective -- embracing o;,ly those residing in the country -- migration 
is harmful. Howe',er, from a "national"· standpoint -- embracing all nationals 
whether at home or abroad -- m.igration may be considered. good or barl depending 
\ 
on the we_ights ass_igned to migrants and non-migrants. Naturally, a similar ar-
gument in reverse-may be applied to the countr 1 of immigration. 
Presumably, the int-,nt of the brain-drain all_egation is domestic. A 
word of warning, however: one cannot merely look at, say, gross domestic or 
national product per capita Lefore and after m_igration and deduce domestic wor-
seni~g if this measure falls. If it is the relatively well-off who emigrate 
(because of the role of education or the need for financing movement), the re-
maining group could have their incomes per person raised yet overaU income per 
person m_ight fall as the wealthy leave. It is worth noting that the same is 
also true for the imm_igration country, Indeed, i~ is quite possible for 
international migration to lower income per capita in both sendi_ng and 
recei vi_ng countries yet leave everyone better off! 
Within the context of perfect markets where productive fi.ctors are paid 
their social worth, the theoretical literature on the domestic efficiency or in-
efficiency of emigration (and immigration) has been shown to depend upon several 
aspects of this movement. 3 In particular, the arguments hinge on four main fea-
tures: whether the extent of migration is so small as to have negligible "secon-
dary" effects on the non-migrants; the degree of openesss of the economy to the 
influences of international trade in commodities; the extent to which migrants 
are also owners of productive capital and whether this capital is relocated 
upon migration; and whether one considers th*se issues in a timeless world or for 
an economy with on-going growth, 
1). On the finite effects of migration 
The challenge of Grubel and Scott (1966) to the brain drain allegation 
may be outlined as follows. Emigration will indeed reduce domestic production, 
3. The following paragraphs draw extensively on the excellent survey by Bhag-
wati and Rodriguez (1976). 
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but workers are paid according to how much production would fall if they individ-
ually did not contribute. Thus, production falls by the amount of the emigrant's 
prior earnings and the remaining pie is exactly the amount previously divided 
amongst the non-migrants. Naturally, the same story may be applied to the coun-
try of destination. Thus, the only persons affected are the migrants and they 
are presumably enriched. 
However, this position has subsequently been shown (Berry and Soligo 
1969, Tobin 1974) to depend crucially upon only an infinitessimal amount of emigra-
tion or immigration occuring. If emigration implies that less labor is now-
applied to the same amount of land and domestic equipment, the productivity of 
remaining workers tends to rise and that of land and equipment to fall. In a 
competitive situation this will imply a rise in wage rates and a fall in rates 
of profit. However, it is a well~known result in economics that over a finite 
range of change the gain of workers will not completely off-set the loss of capi-
talists -- there is a loss in so-called "surplus" which represents a real domestic 
loss resulting from emigration in these circumstances. 
2). The degree of openess 
The foregoing, finite change, counter argument depends crucially on 
shifting productivities of capital and labor as emigration proceeds. However, 
Johnson (1967) has pointed out that, at least under certain circumstances, such 
shifts may not occur. The mechanism of these circumstances is one wherein the 
changing relative availability of factors as emigration or immigration occurs 
induces only a restructuring of the mix of goods produced domestically, In par-
ticular, reduction in labor availability is associated with increased output of 
goods requiring relatively more capital per worker and reduction in output of 
the relatively more II labor intensive" goods. 
If this is an ec.ononiy where all commodities are either imported or expor-
ted (an open economy), and where the volume of this country's trade has no in-
fluence on world market prices (a "small" economy), then in the end shifting 
patterns of production imply that the productivity of domestic factors remains 
unaffected by international migration and one returns to the result of Grubel 
and Scott. 4 The increased production of labor intensive goods in the immigra-
tion country so increases the usefulness of labor as to offset any tendency to 
declining labor productivity, and vice versa in the emigration economy. 
3). The ownership and mobility of capital 
A second tacit assumption, underlying the swry of shifting factor pro-
ductivities in the finite migration story in (1) above, is the application of 
less labor to a fixed amount of capital. However, the possibility of,,1111igrants 
moving their assets with them must be admitted, a possibility analyzed by John-
son (1967) and by Berry and Soligo (1969). Two attributes of this scenario mat-
ter: whether migrants own the same amount of assets per working migrant as the 
non-migrants, or a different amount; secondly, whether the migrants move their 
capital with them. Consider these in turn. 
Imagine a situation where emigrants own more capital on average than the 
remaining group, so it is the wealthy who leave, and they remove their capital 
with them, The effect is, of course, less equipment per worker. Assuming a 
competitive situation (and an economy not of the small open variety), wages will 
tend to fall and profit rates rise. Since, however, the non-migrants own rela-
tively little capital their incomes are unambigously reduced. 
The opposite is also true. That is, if emigrants own relatively little 
capital, even if they remove this small amount with them, capital domestically 
available per person rises with emigration. In this case, the wage to profit 
rate ratio rises, but the non-migrants own relatively large amounts of capital and 
4. This result is subject to the proviso of relevance of a model of the Heck-
scher-Ohlin-Samuelson type in international t:rade. 
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consequently .again loseo In short, and speaking loosely, capitalists are hurt 
by emigration of their workers. Workers are hurt by emigration of the capitalists. 
No matter whether the migrants are relatively capital rich or capital 
poor, their movement always harms the domestic group left behind when their cap-
ital moves with the migrants. The solitary exception is when migrants own exactly 
the same amount of assets per worker as do the non-migrating group, in which 
case wages and profits neither rise nor fall and the domestic group remains un-
affected. · 
One cannot, however, rule out the possibility of the domestic group 
gaining. This eventuality arises when migrants leave their capital behind. Sup-
pose emigrants are relatively wealthy, but do not move their assetso In this 
instance, capital per worker rises with emigration and hence wage rates rise 
relative to profits. For the relatively capital-poor non-migrants this necessarily 
implies a gaino Note that this occurs even without appropriation of emigrants' 
capital -- despite the fact that emigrants may continue to receive the profits 
from the assets they left behindo 
.From the view-point of original residents of an immigration country, the 
converse story applieso Namely, that any change in the capital-to.Jabor ratio, 
resulting from migrants arriving with a different wealth endowment as compared to 
natives,raises the incomes of the lattero Loosely: the arrival of workers bene-
fits the indigenous capitalist; the arrival of capitalists benefits the native 
workers. 
From this general perspective; the tendency of migrants to move their 
capital with them is clearly seen to be important, and has consequently attracted 
empirical investigation. A word of reservation is in order, however, with regard 
to at least some of these empirical efforts. Quite obviously, migrants do not pack 
factories in their suit cases, nor usually even machineryo The capital transferred 
by migrants is normally in the form of financial capital, recorded on capital ac-
count in the balance of payments. Hence, at least some investigators have analyzed 
the effect of emigration (or immigration) on capital flows on balance of payments 
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accounts. But this can be misleading. The essence of the Johnson Berry-Soligo 
model is changes in physical capital available to workers. This transfer across 
countries occurs, for the most part, through not replacing worn out equipment in 
the losing country and through physical investment in the acquiring economy. Such 
changes, of course, take time, which indicates another ·difference between the la-
bor migration and labor-cum-capital mobility stories -- the former is "short-
run" the latter "long-run". To analyze capital flows on balance of payments ac-
count rather than domestic investment rates is then inappropriate. Nor is there 
a simple relationship between changes in the two, for increased inflows on capital 
account may simply be used to increase levels of consumption rather·than of invest-
ment. 
Finally, we may note a not inconsiderable weakness of these models of mi-
gration with capital mobility -- the failure to consider inducement to relocate 
capital according to profit rate availability rather than imposing mechanistic 
assumptions on transfer or non-transfer. To this issue, we shall return shortly 
when considering global efficiency. Meanwhile, it is worth pointing out that the 
migrant has no choice but to remove with himself at least one type of capital 
namely human capital or skill. To lump together physical and human capital is not 
uncommon in analysis, though it can serve to hide some features. It is tempting, 
therefore, to move toward distinguishing at least three types of productive factor 
-- capital, skilled and unskilled labor. 6 Generalizations from such a world do 
not, unfortunately, merely require trivial extensions of the labor -capital story. 
It is well-known that relative composition of ownership of three factors (in this 
case between migrants and non-migrants) is tricky to unambiguously define. For 
5, See, for example, Isbister (1977) and references therein. 
6. See, for example, Grubel (1975). 
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example, emigrants may have relatively large amounts of capital per skilled worker 
but relatively large amounts of capital p·er skilled worker as compared to the re-
maini.ng group. Thus, simple parallels with the statements on changing relative 
availability of factors associated with migration are lost. Moreover, the conse-
quences of any given change in mix are far less apparent: whereas one is ready to 
assume loss of workers raises labor productivity relative to capital, departure 
of skilled labor may either raise or lower productivity of unskilled labor rel-
ative to capital productivity, depending on which the skilled laborers more 
closely complement. 
4). The growing economy context. 
The above account of capital movement tends to assume a given amount of 
capital which is or is not moved irrespective of the economic incentives to relo-
cate capital. On the other hand, the comments on the adjustment process through 
permitted depreciation or accelerated investment.begin to suggest a role for time. 
Recently, some authors have begun to consider not merely shifting a given amount 
of capital from one place to another through investment and disinvestment, but the 
on-going process of capital building. 7 
Within the perfect market situation, three elements emerge as important: 
the initial transfer of capital by immigrants, the savings behavior of immigrants 
relative to residents, and whether immigration is a one-shot or continuing process. 
The initial capital transfer has already been considered above, and no new insight 
is really provided by these dynamic stories except that the initial transfer even-
tually becomes irrelevant. The reason is a basic feature of all growth stories of 
the (neoclassical) type considered by each of these authors -- namely that in the 
end, equipment per worker and hence per capita output depend only on savings habits 
and the rate of growth of population. 
7. Mishan and Needleman (1968), Berry and Soligo (1969), McCulloch and Yellen 
(1974, 1975), Rodriguez (1975, 1976). 
However, the second two elements savings behavior o.f immigrants and 
whether migration continues -- do affect the situation even in the long-run. A 
continuing steady stream of migration of course raises labor force. growth in 
the country of immigration and lowers it in the sending country. If the rate 
of saving in the two countries remains as before, then equipment per worker is 
affected permanently by this continuing migration. Similarly, if there is only 
a one-shot migration, but migrants have different savings habits compared to non-
migrants (including different attitudes to investment in education) then savings 
are permanently affected in the two countries and hence the rate of accumulation 
of capital is permanentl)' altered, but the labor force growth is not. Again, 
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the capital-labor ratios are permanently altered. In either case, tf·e conse-
quences are exactly ;malogous to the static story of capital movement with migra-
tion: any change in the capitatper worker hurts those remaining in the country of 
emigration and helps the indigenous group in the receiving country. 
From fr.e perspective of the emigration country this may be seen as follows, 
the converse story holding for the immigration economy. A constant outflow of 
workers with no change in savings means less labor to work the mounting capital 
stock, and so native owners of this capital permanently lose. Similarly, a one-
shot departure of high-savers permanently lowers the amount of equipment per wor-
ker, thus lowering wages of the relatively capital-poor remaining group. On the 
other hand, a one-shot departure of relatively low savers permanently raises the 
level of equipment per person. This, however, lowers the rate of profit on capital 
about which the sedentary group of high savers are more concerned than the counter-
veiling increase in their wages. 
But the context of this type of dynamic analysis is clearly quite limited, 
even beyond the assumption of perfect markets, In particular, one might emphasize 
three types of limitation. 
i) Al though changes hinge on changed rewards to capital and labor any 
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such change in the rate of profit does not affect willingness to save. Berry-
Soligo (1969) and Rodriguez (1975) have considered more complex situations in 
which the latter dependence is explicitly incorporated, but unfortunately the 
emergent results are quite ambiguous. 
ii) The above models are built on the assumption that savings materialize 
as physical investment in the country in which the savers' incomes are earned. 
None of the existing models, so far as I am aware, consider the important role 
of target-saver migration in today's world. Through remittances, savings out 
of income earned in the country of immigration may well generate investment in 
the country of emigration. This would produce a situation analogous to the 
static story where capital is left behind, and thus admits the possibility of 
non-migrant gain as fellow citizens continue to emigrate. 
iii) Finally, note that in the instance of a small open economy, differ-
ent savings behavior of immigrants, and steady migration without compensating 
changes in savings, may serve only to change the patterns of goods produced and 
hence traded. As in the static case, international migration would then have no 
effects on non-migrants, leaving rewards to capital and labor unaltered. 
b). The perfect market variant; global perspective 
Production of goods and services generally entails the location of labor 
and its implements at the same site. Efficient production requires workers to 
be equipped in a similar fashion everywhere within a given industry. One way 
to achieve this efficient balance is through migration of labor. If higher 
wages serve as a signal of a relative shortage of workers, in the sense that 
existing workers arc better tooled, then migration towards higher wages serves 
to more efficiently allocate workers across the available equipment. Indeed, it 
is precisely this role of migration which has attracted most attention in the 
study of internal migration in economics (Lucas 1977), 
But such mobility of labor may not be necessary for efficiency. Much of 
the theory of international trade has, until recently, tended to assume that 
factors of production are not mobile across international boundaries. Samuelson 
(1949) has shown that by choosing to locate industries demanding relatively more 
labor as compared to capital in labor abundant countries, and vice versa, an 
efficient use of factors may be achieved without migration. In reality, however, 
many elements tend to prohibit such an efficient distribution of industries 
across countries, and at least in this constrained context migration may be es-
sential to greater efficiency. 
The alternative, of course, is to move the capital to the workers. Effi-
ciency of location then is a question of economies of agglomeration, transport 
costs of materials, and natural advantages of locations for particular industries, 
all conditioned by the status quo, In this light, it is interesting to note that 
the causes of migration deliberated in section I are extremely partial in view. 
To say that workers move because the good jobs are elsewhere begs the question 
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of why they are ·elsewhere. In this sense,economists have relatively little to say 
about the ultimate causes of migration, as compared to geographers and historians 
-- students of space and time. For if all factors are mobile and persue the lo-
cation of highest reward, the system is indeterminate ultimately, the fixing 
factors are those of historical incident and of natural locational advantage. 
c). Market imperfections. 
Thus far, our outline of efficiency implications of international migration, 
from a domestic and global view point, has assumed factors of production are re-
warded according to their social worth in the sense of incremental contribution 
to society's product. While this remains the setting of most of the theoretical 
literature in this field, it is quite clearly extremely limiting. In this section, 
I shall therefore comment on a few particular market "failures" which have begun 
to· , or should, attract more systematic attention. 
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1) Unemployment. 
In our discussion of the causes of migration, not only wage differentials 
were considered, but also employment conditions and hence expected wage differ-
ences, Yet employment difficulties have not entered the consideration of effi-
ciency consequences above. In the foregoing stories, it was assumed that addi-
tional workers would raise output and vice versa, and the only thing that mattered 
was whether this generated secondary effects on others through the price mechan-
ism, and whether associated capital or savings mobility would affect the situa-
tion, But if unemployment of labor exists, emigration may not reduce output 
nor immigration increase it even in the absence of capital movement. 
Consider first the country of emigration, Several alternative scenarios 
are quite feasible: 
i). Perhaps the simplest situation is the departure of an unemployed 
worker, with no other adjustments occuring. In this instance, the solitary 
effect is a decline in population and non-migrants now share the same pie 
amongst a smaller number. The same story also holds if a previously employed 
worker leaves and his job is taken by an unemployed person with no other ad-
justments, On the other hand, if an employed worker emigrates and there 
exists some barrier to hiring in his position (as, for example, in the case 
of electricity workers in Bangladesh -- a case of emigration attracting some 
controversy), then output indeed declines and the analysis of the prior sec-
tions becomes pertinent, 
ii), The situation may be further complicated by the possibility of 
rural-urban migration. As suggested in section I, the rate of migration be-
tween any two places may be accelerated by reduced umemployment in the des-
tination, To emigrate from an urban area experiencing unemployment may then 
initially serve only to reduce unemployment without loss of output. But, 
by rendering the urban zone more attractive,this emigration may then induce 
migration from country to town. The question ultimately then becomes one 
as to whether rural output will decline as peasants leave the countryside. 
On the latter, there is no clear consensus of opinion for the LDC case, 
but recent opinion seems to lean toward a presemption of reduced output. 
(See Lucas 1977)0 
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iii). The above comments tend to treat labor as relatively homo-
geneous. Additional considerations enter, though, if one is contemplating 
emigration of skilled labour in the presence of unemployment. First, it is 
clear that one may have unemployment on the whole yet full employment of pro-
fessionals, (essentially the situation in Bangladesh for example). In the 
short-run, the effect of professionals' emigration must simply be a loss of 
their prior contribution to output, raising the questions outlined in earlier 
sub-sections. But in the long-run, the skilled vacancies created will tend 
to attract aspirations of the unskilledo The mere fact that some unskilled 
persons are unemployed does not, however, mean that the skilled slot may 
be filled without loss of output. For even beyond the considerations in 
(i) and (ii), one must recognize the very real cqst of training an unskilled 
person to replace the skilled emigranto 8 Such costs comprise lower output 
potential of the trainee during transition (zero output if this involves 
formal education), direct tuition costs of training, and possibly damage 
to equipment in the interim. It is this net loss in output which must then 
be counted against professional emigration in considering its domestic effi-
ciency implications. 
On the other hand, if professionals are unemployed or underemployed, 
then other things equal, their emigration will not cause a fall in domestic 
outputo At least two caveats ·must be placed on this view though,. First, a 
., 
8, See Bhagwati and Hamada (1976), Hamada and Bhagwati (1976), McCulloch and 
Yellen (1976) and Rodriguez (1976). 
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reduced unemployment rate amo.ngst professionals may render "migration" via 
trainfog into the skilled category more attractive, as in the Harris-Todaro 
migration story, possibly causing a fall in output, Second, unemployment 
amongst the educated is common in many societies immediately after gradua-
tion. In many instances, this may be seen as a period of search for the 
right career to enter. Departure of professionals in the face of this type 
of unemployment may· nonetheless reduce output, if the perceived need for 
the search process is unaffected -- the emigrants will not in this instance 
9 be immediately replaced by their unemployed equals. 
iv), Finally, we may consider some secondary effects of emigration 
when unemployment prevails, depending upon the "cause" of this unemployment. 
If unemployment is of the Keynesian type, (with insufficient aggregate 
demand), then the effect of emigration on those sources of spending leading 
to multiple expansion of demand and hence employment becomes important. Al-
though emigration per se is, if anything, likely to discourage domestic in-
vestment, one must think also of the spending implications of associated re-
mittances, which must be seen as an injection of new demand into the economy, 
For example, in many countries, a substantial fraction of remittances is 
being spent on real estate, The induced activity in the construction sector 
provides a source of employment, as does the spending of the additional con-
struction workers, and so forth. 
On the other hand, if unemployment is of the structural or bottle-neck 
type, a very different picture may emerge, Thus, if lack of capital capacit_y 
is seen as the "source" of unemployment, (which is, of course, untrue for· 
economies with widespread idle capacity), then the spending of remittances 
9, Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1976) raise a related point. Emigration itself may 
involve a prior search process for jobs and for permission to migrate, Such search 
may be more effectively continued in the city where jobs may be scarce. Thus, al-
though emigration occurs from the pool of urban unemployment, in the absence of 
emigration temptation,search would not be attractive and the unemployed might 
return to productive employment in the countryside. 
on real estate or other "non-productive" items must be seen as a failure to 
commute unemployment thro.ugh bottle-neck relief. 
In a related manner, if skilled and unskilled workers are highly 
complementary in production, and if the availability of skilled workers is 
the bottle-neck to greater employment of unskilled workers, then emigration 
of professionals may serve to increase unemployment amongst the unskilled. 
Indeed, this may dominate the tendency to reduce such unemployment through 
training and subsequent employment in the skilled category. 
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Next,· let us turn more briefly to the immig:rntion side of the picture when 
unemployment prevails. Our perfect market story assumed that immigration will in-
crease local output, the only questions were the secondary implications for the in-
digenous group and the long-run effects of capital and savings transfer. However, 
if unemployment already exists locally, then even the absolute expansion of out-
put may be questioned. 
i). Suppose, initially, the immigrant arrives only to join the pool 
of unemployed (a possiblity ruled out by immigration policy for legal entry 
amongst labor preference categories of immigrants, for example, in the U.S.). 
Naturally, any expansion of local output can only occur through very secon-
dary effects. The latter might, for example, include expanded demand re-
sulting from the immigrants spending leading to higher output in an econ-
omy suffering from Keynesian unemployment. Again, however, a caveat must 
be added. An initial period of job search may be intrinsic to placing the 
immigrant in the right job. Although initially unemployed, the immigrant 
may nevertheless contribute to increased local production in the longer 
run, and the initial period of unemployment may represent an important part 
of contributing efficiency. 
ii). If the immigrant arrives to immediate employment, or if he soon 
finds suitable work, he or she presumably contributes to output in a direct 
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sense. However, there may be no net expansion of output. The reason, of 
course, is that the immigrant may simply have displaced an earlier inhab-
itant from this job -- a source of frequent complaint. Straight displace-
ment is quite clear cut. More complex is an alternative, and perhaps com-
mon scenario. 
In the case of European guest workers, one often hears that the im-
migrants are not displacing local workers, as they are doing such attrocious 
jobs that local workers would have been unwilling to perform anyway. But 
"unwillingness" may be a function of wage. Local workers may avoid jobs 
offering poor working conditions and ·1ow wages, and such jobs may, and in-
deed are, often filled by immigrants. If there were no immigrants, it is 
conceivable such jobs would offer sufficiently higher wages as to render 
them acceptable to locals, and in this sense locals are indeed displaced. 
If this is not true, then the performance of these menial tasks by immigrants 
does contribute to overall net production, and may lead to multiple expan-
sion in output through spending most of their earned incomes. 
2). Distorted commodity prices 
Not only may the price of labor be out of line in the sense of creating 
unemployment, but other prices may also be inappropriate, In particular, the 
social value of goods produced may differ from the price markets attribute to 
them, a divergence arising for many reasons. Thus, even though a worker may be 
paid according to how much output evaluated in prevailing prices would change 
net if (s)he emigrated or illll)ligrated, this payment may not reflect the social 
contribution of the worker. Of course, this argument may go either way, and re-
quires very careful consideration of the specific context. It is worth noting, 
however, that this argument is particularly common with respect to medical workers: 
health care is frequently viewed as worth more than its price and hence that med-
cal workers are worth more to society than reflected by their pay. Thus, emigra-
tion by medical workers would lead to a loss to the non-migrants, even if such 
movement had no secondary effects through finite changes nor.associated shifts 
of capital or savings. That emigrating medics are from the urban sector, whereas 
the social shortage is in the rural zone may not be an effective counterargument. 
As Hamada and Bhagwati (1976) have shown, removal of doctors from the urban sec-
tor may so reduce the incentive for doctors to diffuse from town to country that 
the entire net incidence of the reduction in doctors may actually fall on the 
rural sector. 
3). The foreign exchange rateo 
In many, if not most countries, the foreign exchange rate is out of line. 
This is true not only in the sense of persistant balance of payments deficit 
(or surplus) but also in the sense that the prevailing exchange rate does not 
reflect the true worth of foreign reserves to the economy. At least two impli-
cations for migration are worthy of mention. 
In the production of tradeable goods, in essence,workers are producing 
foreign exchange, either through export earnings or through import reductions. 
Emigration or immigration of workers affecting employment in these sectors, con-
sequently alters society's earnings of foreign exchangeo But if the market and 
social evaluation of this exchange diverge, then the social loss (or gain) in 
output may differ from the private perception of this changeo For example, a 
worker may emigrate because his local wage is lbw relative to the foreign wage. 
It may not be worth the local employer offering·a higher wage because the value 
of foreign·currency earned from this worker's exported product is.not too high. 
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But for the economy as a whole, this foreign exchange is worth more, and so society 
loses more than the worker's wage earnings if he leaves. There is thus a net loss 
to society from this element alone.· 
On the other h,md, remittances by emigrant workers gain foreign exchange 
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for the home country (and lose it for the immigration country). The emigrants 
(or their local dependants) perceive this foreign currency in terms of its 
buying power given the market exchange rate available to them. But to society 
this foreign exchange may be worth more. This type of divergence causes private 
perceptions of the remittance benefits to migration to be less than social valu-
ation, and hence on these grounds too little emigration would occur as compared 
to what is domestically most efficient. 
4) Subsidised education. 
Returning to the perfect market situation for a moment, Berry and Soligo 
(1969) have shown that, if individuals pay for their own education and elect to 
educate themselves such that their investment in education is rewarded through 
appropriately higher subsequent wages, withdrawal of educated or uneducated 
workers leaves the remaining group neither better nor worse off (assuming capital 
per person remains unchanged). The essence of the argument is this: a departure 
of educated persons initially raises wages of the educated as they become scarce. 
This stimulates an expanded rate of education in the economy which continues until 
the mix of skilled and unskilled returns to its original level and, with this mix 
unaltered, output per (remaining) person is unchanged in the end. As Berry and 
Soligo note, however, even this ·story is subject to an important proviso: that 
the cost of transforming an unskilled person into the skilled category does not 
rise as emigration procedes. This provision would not hold if the emigrating 
educated persons were naturally more talented, for as one dips lower in the scale 
of natural talent, attainment of a given skill level presumably requires more re-
sources and effort. 
But in almost no country does the typical person (or the family) bear the 
full costs of his or her education. This fact is one of the keys to complaint 
against the brain drain. There exists a common feeling that having supported the 
education of others through taxation or donation, one loses by subsequent emigration 
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of the educated who owe a debt to their country. But Grubel and Scott (1966) 
correctly emphasize the importance of intergenerational transfers in this con-
text. In essence, by receiving higher incomes and paying higher total taxes, the 
educated adults of one generation tend to pay for the education of the next gen-
eration and hence in a steady flow situation may be seen as paying for their own 
education. Post-education emigration reduces tax revenue within the country, but 
since the emigrants' heirs will not require local education the effect may balance 
out. There are, however, important reservations to be expressed with regard to 
this view: 
i). It assumes the children of the educated are those on whom the educa-
tional subsidy foregone would have been spent. Yet each generation may be 
taxed to finance the education of bright children of the uneducated -- a 
process which may be efficient. If so, departure of the emigrated will 
either raise the tax burden on those remaining or imply a reduction in 
education of the next generation. 
ii). As Johnson (1966) notes, the intergenerational effect can work not 
only forward but backwards. Current pensioners paid taxes during their 
working life to support the previous generation of pensioners, implicitly 
on the understanding that they in turn will be supported by the next gen-
eration. Even if the children of emigrants leave, if the emigrants' parents 
do not also accompany them, then departure of (educated or uneducated) 
workers results in a loss for the remaining group. 
iii). Weisbrod (1966) argues that social services, such as education, are 
frequently subject to declining average costs as utilization expands. Re-
duction in use through emigration, assuming equal sharing of costs amongst 
residents, then reduces tax revenue by more than the decline in the total 
cost of service provision. Naturally, the non-migrating group then lose. 
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Note that this discussion tends to assume that domestic taxation of nationals 
ceases upon emigrationo This is not true for every country in fact, in some 
instances world-wide taxation of citizens continues as long as citizenship is 
retained. 
The prior discussion also omits any consideration of certain "externalities" 
connected with education. It is conceivable that individuals actually derive 
pleasure from the presence of educated persons in the country 
sheer pride, or via the implications for political atmosphere 
perhaps through 
in whict case the 
brain drain of necessity implies domestic loss. On the other hand, prestige of 
national scientists may be enhanced by their expanded opportunities abroad, and 
domestic pride may transcend mere absenceo 
Finally, the need for discussion of subsidised education in the country 
of immigration may be absolved by noting only that the prior arguments may gen-
erally be applied in a reverse direction. It is, nonetheless, worth mentioning 
that of course a substantial amount of international migration occurs for the 
purpose of obtaining (subsidised) education, Since it is frequently mu·ch simpler 
for educated persons to migrate (because of reduced demand restrictions, perhaps 
greater pay differentials, changes in attitude, and greater possibility of saving 
to finance movement), subsidized education at home or abroad is likely to increase 
international migration. IO Although subsidising the education of foreign students 
then presumably represents a benefit to the students, whether it ought to be char-
acterized as aid to their country of origin must rest on the likelihood of the 
"return of the native" and the implications for the uneducated in either event. 
5), Capital market imperfectionso 
In the section on causes of migration, the idea of migration as an invest-
10. Berry and Soligo (1974) raise the additional point, that subsidized education 
at home increases the supply of educated workers hence tending to depress their 
local wages and stimulate greater migrationo 
ment in future earnings was introduced. This notion draws attention to another 
set of market failures which may lead to global as well as domestic inefficien-
cies in migration, namely imperfect capital markets. 
If different groups within a country have varying degrees of access to 
borrowed funds, then even if all else is functioning smoothly, emigration may 
occur more readily amongst a group where out-migration is socially less desirable, 
For example, suppose a nation were considering in whom to invest migration funds 
in a target-saver situation. Given savings habits and the foreign wage premium 
of different groups, a certain pattern of expenditure on out-migration would be 
socially most efficient. But private choices with regard to migration may not 
emulate this pattern when, for example, the educated group has easier access to 
borrowing. Unfortunately, though, the mere observation of different rates of 
interest available to various classes is not prima facia evidence of imperfection 
-- one must of necessity ask why such differentials persist. For example, if 
group A. is charged a higher interest rate to borrow funds for a work-spell abroad 
because there is a greater risk they will never return as compared to group B, 
this risk may also be considered a real cost to society. It is well-known that 
imperfect capital markets are not only difficult to identify but even to define. 
Wher·e such imperfections are prevalent, they may also bear upon global ef-
ficiency. The perfect market variant of global efficiency pictured taking workers 
from their less productive locations and moving them to more productive sites, 
hence enhancing production. But if workers of different countries cannot finance 
mobility equally easily, and if these differences do not reflect real cost dif-
ferences, then one may well not observe movement from the most warranted place. 
To move an unskilled worker from West Europe to North America may increase world 
output less than moving a worker from the Sahel to North America, yet the former 




6). · Demand restrictions. 
Finally, from a global perspective, the maintenance of restrictions on im-
migration in many countries has to be inefficient, unless they are deployed in 
some way to counter another failure -- which on the whole seems unlikely. Such 
entry restrictions are, rather, an expression of conflict between domestic effi-
ciency (or incomes of a particular domestic group) in the country of immigration 
and global efficiency. 
Whether preferential or discriminatory entry restrictions are more or 
less harmful than across the board restrictions is generally indeterminant from 
a global welfare-theoretic viewpoint. 11 
7.) "Non-economic" factors. 
The above list of market imperfections in relation to international migra-
tion far from exhausts the set of economic consequences, though it is hopefully 
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indicative of some of the major effects. But it would be unreasonable to end 
without acknowledgement of some of the "non-economic" outcomes not adequately 
entering the calculus of individual emigrants' decisions. 
The departure of adult males unaccompanied by their families is clearly 
disruptive of traditional familial arrangements. Where families take joint de-
cisions, this disruption must be seen as a cost acceptable to the family in return 
for the higher income stream, which may be shared amongst all of the family through 
remittances. But in a male dominated society, it may well be doubted whether the 
emigration decision necessarily reflects the best interests of the women or chil-
dren left without a father's presence, either with respect to the discrete decision 
to go, length of stay, or timing of the departure. Disruption occurs, of course, 
11. This statement follows immediately from the well-known general theory of 
the second best. 
12. See also, for example, the discussion of the wage emulation effect in Bhagwati 
and Hamada (1974). 
even though men leave prior to marriage. Indeed, in this latter circumstance men 
are far more likely to ignore the wishes of a yet unknown future wife. 
On the immigration side, given a fair degree of xenophobia in most coun-
tries, arrival of aliens is unfortunately often seen as a cost in its own right. 
Since local employers have little incentive to care about such public prejudices, 
unless they materialize in the form of higher wages through movement of natives 
out of the particular neighborhood, the wage inducement to immigration will not 
reflect the full domestic willingness to accept foreign workers. Natually, the 
degree of local resentment will itself tend to deter immigration, so at least 
through this infelicitous mechanism local non-employer discrimination in attitude 
against foreign immigrants may materialize. Whether this is a desirable outcome 
depends on whose viewpoint one adopts, but foreign non-residents have little pro-
tection against discrimination under most national constitutions. 
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Finally, there is a phenomenon which utilitarian economics finds awfully 
difficult to evaluate, Migration in general, and perhaps international migration 
in particular, can have profound effects on attitudes and tastes. Whether a more 
cosmopolitan perspective is a good or bad thing cannot be answered objectively. 
But there is the real possibility that any breaking with traditional mores amongst 
returning emigrants imposes a psychological cost on traditionalists, a cost not 
entering the pros and cons of the individual initially deliberating whether to 
emigrate, 
B), Distribution 
Thus far, the consequences of international migration have been considered 
from an efficiency angle, To the extent that efficiency gains or losses emerge, 
there is a very important question as to who receives these benefits or losses, 
Moreover, even if there are efficiency gains some groups may lose and vice versa. 
In other words, the distributional effects are certainly important and at least 
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d . 13 some authors feel they ominateo 
Fortunately, much of the ground-work has been laid in the previous sub-
sections. Thus, one type of distributional question is the allocation of gains 
and losses amongst three groups: the non-migrants of the emigrating country, 
the migrants, and the indigenous population in the immigration country. The 
entire discussion of "domestic efficiency" is aimed precisely at this topic, and 
does not bear repetition hereo 
As to distribution within the domestic groups, the bulk of attention has 
fallen on the functional distribution\ 4 (between capitalists, workers, skilled 
workers, and so forth) rather than size distribution (variance of incomes, or 
Gini coefficients)o Again then, the previous sub-sections have already presented 
sufficient discussion of consequences for profit rates, wages and employment as 
to obviate the need for futher explicit discussion hereo A couple of issues re-
main outstanding and worthy of brief outline, however. 
First, the question of occupational bumping or the job-ladder effect. 15 
The essential idea here perceives a hierarchy of jobs or occupations over which 
social progress is defined. In the course of sodal upward mobility a worker 
proceeds up the rungs of the hierarchical job ladder. Entry into any point on 
the hierachy is then depicted as rationed by ranking available workers according 
to some criteria -- such as education, age or discriminatory characteristics of 
race or sex. Entry or exit of workers from the over-all domestic pool through 
immigration or emigration then results in a reordering of the queue, depending 
upon the characteristics of the migrants. Thus, the distribution of jobs amongst 
non-migrants is shifted by migration. 
Some economists would deny the relevance of this story to income distri-
13. See, for example, Weisbrod (1966). 
14. See, for example, Isbister (1977), McCulloch and Yellen (1976). 
15. See Porter (1965), Hamada and Bhagwati (1976) and Isbister (1977)0 
bution outcomes within the domestic. groups. Emigration of a brain surgeon may 
leave a qualified carpenter as the next best candidate for the job: but the car-
penter would probably get few customers and receive no higher salary as a poor 
brain surgeon then as the best available carpenter! Though facetious, this ex-
ample serves to highlight an important aspect of occupational bumping stories: 
they are of relevance to wage distribution only if the occupation performed has 
some implication for wage quite independent of workers' own characteristics. 16 
It is important, however, that such occupational effects be of a relevant type. 
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To illustrate: the immigration of educated foreigners might displace some native 
school teachers who become, say, garbage collectors. The displaced workers might 
even experience a gain in earnings from the transfer, but it is doubtful they 
will gain in the sense of total economic well-being. Similarly, one might be 
displaced.into a higher wage job offering identical work environment, but providing 
no on-the-job training and hence little in future prospects. Jobs do, however, 
become relevant when "institutional" barriers prevent reassignment of equal workers 
across jobs until they are equally rewarded -- a scenario described in the dual 
labor market and job competition stories. 17 
Second, it is not surprising that the Marxist thought on international mi-
gration makes distribution its focal point. International migration might well be 
seen by the Marxist as another arm of imperialism--- of exploita~ion of poor 
countries by the rich. Indeed, as argued above, international migration probably 
is a mechanism for capitalists in high wage countries to gain access to cheap 
labor abroad without exposing themselves to the uncertainties and criticism in-
herent in becoming a capitalist multi-national. On the other hand, it seems 
reasonable to presume the migrants gain through "exploitation". On whether the 
16. See Lucas (1977b). 
17. See Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Thurow and Lucas (1972) respectively. 
30 
remaining group in the country of emigration are hurt or exploited, the jury is 
still out. Interestingly enough, the perfect market neoclassical story, as we 
have seen, tends to support the latter exploitation view. But once unemployment, 
a social premium on foreign exchange, spending and investment out. of remittances, 
and other complicating aspects are admitted to the story, the outcome is not 
obvious. Existing empirical evidence is woefully inadequate, and it has already 
been noted that mere observation of change in income per capita is quite mis-
leading. Certainly the assertion of one Marxist writer (Amin 1974) that no 
region of emigration has ever proceeded to develop is counter factual as any 
Scandinavian could report. 
Many Marxist students of international trade are concerned with the 
phenomenon of unequal exchange. Here, the developed countries are seen as ex-
ploiting the LDCs in the sense that the latter's exports require (directly and 
indirectly) more labor than their imports from the developed nations. Thus, 
unequal work efforts go into this exchange, enabling the rich nations to avoid 
more work. If tru\;), one could move in (at Jeast) four directions to "correct" 
this exploitation. a). By encouraging greater LDC production of those goods 
requiring relatively more capital through raising the world price of the more 
capital intensive goods, or through LDC protection of these industries. But in 
many contexts this is well-known in the trade theory literature to be harmful to 
the LDC rather then helpful. b). By the LDC simply deciding to shift toward 
less labor intensive commodity production without price changes, which must result 
in unemployed labor or lower wages and hardly counters LDC exploitation. c). By 
increasing capital availability in the LDC which for rapid solution requires either 
excessive belt-tightening domestically or importation of foreign capital which 
is hardly more popular amongst Marxist economists d). Or instead of moving the 
capital to the workers to prevent unequal exchange, one can move the workers to 
the capital.. International migration, as noted above, may be a significant factor 
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in promoting global efficiency. If such efficiency were achieved through migra-
tion until the capital labor ratio became the same in every r.egion, (and not 
just the same in every industry with the industrial mix varying), not only 
would rewards of workers be equalized as in the case of varying industrial mix, 
but no trade would be worthwhile and the problem of unequal exchange eliminated. 
Al though international migration is motivated by capitalist willingness 
to exploit cheap foreign labor by inporting such labor, it may serve to raise 
the.·.1iving standards of emigrant and even non-emigrant workers from poorer na-
tions and be a prime potential solution to the Marxists' concern with unequal 
exchange. 
III. Evaluation. 
By now, the reader is probably convinced the consequences of international 
migration are potentially profound and certainly quite complex, both for emigra-
tion and immigration countries. Yet policy makers in both types of country 
must commonly decide whether migration is a "good idea", and if so how much and 
of what type. It is, then, perhaps natural to consider weighing the pros and 
cons within a cost-benefit framework, though such systematic analyses are almost 
18 
nonexistent to dateo 
Broadly, this type of study would divide the population into various cate-
gories: children, semi-skilled men, professional women and so forth. The emigra-
tion or immigration of each is then viewed as a project to be subjected to cost-
benefit criteria. Common to all such project evaluations is the dichotomous 
19 
nature of results -- yea or nay, good or bad -- raising two particular limita-
tions. That the outcome is independent of the magnitude (of migration in our case) 
and conversely no recommendation on extent (of desirable migration) emergeso 
18, See, however, the useful recent work of Guisinger (1979). 
19. Frequently, project evaluations are taken to provide a ranking of projects. 
This is strictly incorrect in most instanceso Nonetheless the above comments 
would apply with equal forceo 
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Provided the net benefits decline with the size of project these may readily be 
handled, by seeing migration of the first thousand persons of any type as one 
20 project, the next thousand another project, and so on. 
The first difficulty in contemplating such cost-benefit evaluation lies 
in defining the objective function of the society in question. In particular, 
the dilemma as to the group of concern domestic or national must be pre-
determined. In the following remarks, I shall generally assume a dichotomy: in 
the event of permanent emigration and always for immigration the concern is for 
the domestic group; but for target-saver emigration it seems perhaps more reason-
able to adopt a national stance. To simplify matters somewhat, I shall also 
assume the objective is one of efficiency, though in principle it is quite pos-
sible to introduce distributional weights recognizing perhaps a greater concern 
for the incidence of costs and benefits on lower income groups. 
Moreover, I shall deal with the context of a "small open economy" as 
described above. From section II. A. a, it is hopefully clear this buys not in-
considerable simplification, for in the context of perfectly functioning markets 
economic effects on the domestic groups are negligible. The result of this is to 
focus attention on the role of various market imperfections, drawing on the dis-
cussion in section II. A. c. Throughout, the elements of "psychic" and "non-
economic" costs or benefits are omitted from explicit consideration owing to the 
21 obvious difficulties of attributing meaningful monetary numbers to such elements. 
The "economic" components of costs and benefits may generally be summed 
using three main classes of prices: the prices of foreign exchange, of labour and 
of cap~tal (or savi.ngs). Since observed market prices are assumed to be misleading 
20. Obviously, if net benefits rise this encounters difficulty as one would tend 
to recommend migration of the second thousand but not the first! 
21. If the various markets are functioning reasonably well, one could in prin-
ciple use observed willingness of individuals to trade-off money income against 
these components to attribute prices to psychic effects. See Lucas (1977b). 
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because of market imperfections, "shadow" prices (true social worth or opportunity 
cost) of these factors must be adopted. The need to compute a distinct worth 
or shadow price of output gained or lost is obviated by the open economy assump-
tion: when every good may be imported or exported the value of output is equiva-
lent to the value of foreign exchange gained through export promotion or import 
substitution. 
Having thus established the setting, let us now proceed to itemize some 
of the components of benefit and cost and consider their evaluations. This may 
be more conviently presented within each of the migration types separately: tem-
porary emigration, permanent emigration, and immigration. 
a). Temporary emigration: the national perspective. 
As mentioned above, this section will consider temporary emigration, per-
haps of the target-saver type, from a national rather than domestic or global 
viewpoint. Several major features of this type of migration must enter the econ-
omic calculus of the sending country: 
i). First, is the decline in domestic production resulting from emigration. 
In practical terms, this output change is not simple to enumerate. For 
example, if additional workers are hired from the pool of urban unemployed 
and/or if further rural-to-urban migration is induced, one must ask not 
what is the emigrant's direct contribution to domestic output, but what 
is the contribution of the emigrant's ultimate replacement. Moreover, any 
initial decline in domestic output may result in a multiple decline through 
a Keynesian style reduction in demand. 
ii). In addition to output foregone, there may be an additional cost in-
curred in drawing other workers into this job. In particular, the extra 
employment amongst non-migrants represents· a loss of leisure which may have 
some value despite previous unemployment. 
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iii). As noted earlier, departure of skilled workers may induce the un-
skilled to increase their training or education. That output of the 
trainee is below that of the emigrant is already accounted for under (i). 
But if the induced training results in temporary output below even the 
trainee's prior contribution, this extra loss must be counted as a cost. 
In addition, any materials used directly in training must be deducted as 
a foreign exchange cost, and the time of supervisors or teachers as a 
labor cost. 
iv). The costs of international (and necessary internal) travel must be 
deducted. Here however an interesting distinction arises. Travel with 
a domestic airline, which normally has some empty seats, represents al-
most a zero real cost despite the high ticket price. Clearly, though, a 
ticket paid in foreign exchange (by the traveller or other domestic source) 
is a cost to be charged to the project. 
v). The major benefit is likely to come from the emigrants' earnings, 
all of which must be included in this national perspective story. But a 
distinction must be made between remittances (including money carried 
home) and money spent abroad. The former is clearly an earning of foreign 
exchange to be valued at shadow price of foreign exchange, a price re-
flecting any multiplier expansion effects in domestic output resulting 
from increased foreign reserves. Spending by workers abroad, although 
obviously a national benefit, must be valued differently. With one ex-
ception, such spending certainly has no multiple expansion effect in the 
home country. (The exception arises through increased home exports of 
native goods for which the migrants have a strong preference. Guisinger 
1979). Moreover, some part of this spending may more accurately be de-
picted as a cost than as a benefit. For example: suppose a worker pre-
viously lived and ate with his family, but abroad must eat out. The 
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extra foreign exchange cost of the second probably far outweighs the 
extra labor cost of home cookingo In principle, such differences ought 
to be netted out, though in practice this may be very difficulto Indeed, 
this becomes yet more complex if the emigrant is replaced by someone from 
the rural zone.who must eat out in the cityo 
vi). It is frequently found that emigrants spend much of their incomes 
on luxury items rather than in productive investmento In developing 
countries placing a premium on productive investment for the sake of 
growth, this is obviously detrimental. But one is probably speaking of 
a low proportion saved out of expanded total income, resulting in greater 
absolute savings. By entering such savings at the premium shadow price 
placed on savings (or future capital) as a benefit, the project is ren-
dered more attractiveo But if other types of emigration or other pro-
jected uses of resources gen·erate the same incomes but higher savings, 
they will dominateo 
In any case, it is not the spending of emigrants alone which 
matters. It is freqently objected that returning migrants squander their 
money on real estate driving up urban land prices rather than investing 
productively. (Paine 1974)0 But the sale of land by a resident to a re-
turnee is a simple transfer of moneyo The real question is how the seller 
of land allocates his cash inflowo 
vii) Many cost-benefit methodologies advocate that public saving or tax 
revenue should also be treated at a premium (libertarians not withstanding). 
If this position is accepted, then obviously government revenue arising 
net out of remittances, versus any decline in domestic taxation, should 
be so pricedo 
viii)o In some instances, there may be a substantial degree of risk as-
sociated with target-saver migrationo In particular, the possibility 
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of a sudden decline in the foreign source of employment for political or 
economic reasons, represents a very real risko This risk should be 
weighed as a cost if, for example, domestic industry is built on the 
assumption of continuing emigration, and cannot be suddenly adapted to 
employ an influx of returning workers who might otherwise have been suc-
cessfully employed at homeo Placing numbers on such risks is not a simple 
exerciseo 
ix)o In general, the benefits and costs must be seen as occurring through 
time -- travel costs coming early, and possibly remittances much later. 
These streams of costs and benefits must then be discounted to the over-
all present value of the particular class of emigrationo By nature, tem-
porary migration has a finite life horizono But if returning migrants will 
be matched by others leaving, the project may be seen as existing in per-
petuityo 
x). Finally, in speaking about time, one must remember that foreign work 
experiences may lead to greater productivity upon returning, through 
suitable acquired skills. The contribution of such extra skill in expan-
ding output must be added on the benefits side of the evaluationo. 
b). Permanent emigration: the domestic perspectiveo 
A shift from national to domestic objectives entails revision of certain 
forms of costs and benefits as follows: 
i)o As Grubel and Scott (1966) emphasize, not all of the loss in domestic 
output should be counted as a cost to emigrationo From the decline in 
output must be subtracted the goods consumed, invested on behalf of, or 
provided by the government exclusively for the migrant prior to emigration. 
Any remaining change in goods represents the alteration in goods available 
to the non-migrant, domestic group. Since, in a world of imperfect mar-
kets, the emigrant may well receive more goods than he produces once all 
goods are correctly evaluated in foreign exchange terms, the effect of 
this deduction may be to transfer the "loss" in output from the cost to 
the benefit sideo 
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ii)o Travel costs borne by the emigrant should not be charged as a cost 
to the remaining domestic groupo However, if the ticket is paid in 
foreign exchange, and restrictions against taking foreign exchange abroad 
effectively endow ownership of all foreign reserves with the domestic 
group, the fall in foreign exchange is a real cost -- even from the domes-
tic perspectiveo 
iii). The earnings of the emigrant spent abroad no longer represent a 
benefit, with two exceptionso First is the item mentioned before -- in-
duced domestic exports of articles popular with emigrants. Second is the 
ambiguous role of remittances in this contexto If the remittance is a 
pure gift to a continuing resident, this clearly is a benefit. On the 
I 
other hand, if the emigre is depositing remittances in a local bank to 
be spent on himself later, there are essentially two attributes: the 
increase in foreign exchange availability at the time of remittance is a 
, 
benefit; in a subsequent time period, when the emigre reclaims his deposits 
it becomes a cost, perhaps mitigated by multiple expansion of domestic 
output if currency restrictions oblige the emigrt to increase his pur-
chases of domestically produced goodso In other words, it is essentially 
like an export with payment occuring long before delivery. 
iv). Provided the emigrants previously did some amount of saving, overall 
saving will be reduced by their departureo On the other hand, the emi-
grants themselves presumably received a significant portion of the bene-
fits of their own savingo The fact that savings are normally valued at a 
premium in cost-benefit studies, indicates that capital accumulation 
through savings has a beneficial effect for society as a whole in excess 
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of the private benefits received by the saver. Thus, savings of emi-
grants would have benefited the nation over and above the income received 
by the emigrants on their savings. But, of course,emigrants are a por'-
tion of the nation and hence would have received a portion of the excess 
benefits to the nation. The cost of reduced savings for the non-migrant 
group may then be calculated as society's evaluation of these savings, 
minus private income of emigrants from the savings, and minus the frac-
tion of the remainder attributable to emigrants as a proportion of orig-
inal population. 
v). Having added in any reduction in provision of government services 
permissible because of the departure of emigrants, one must count as a 
cost the total loss in local tax revenues due to emigration. 
vi). Within this domestic perspective, it might perhaps be natural 'also 
to ignore any risk emigrants run of finding themselves suddenly unemployed 
abroad. But as citizens, the local country may be obliged to accept 
emigrants returning in hard times, and such sudden return may well im-
pose a disruptive cost on the domestic group. 
vii). Finally, if emigration is permanent, that emigrants receive 
training abroad is totally irrelevant from the domestic perspective. 
c). Immigration. 
Fortunately, there is no particular need to consider the elements of 
benefit and cost individually in the case of immigration, for this is essentially 
a mirror image of the foregoing outline of permanent emigration. 
IV. Policies 
Once an evaluation procedure has indicated the desirability or detriment 
of emigration or immigration of particular groups, and perhaps the magnitude, the 
influence of various policie•s on migration must be understood to design an over-
all scheme for guiding migration in the "public" interest. A listing of some 
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policy alternatives is here divided into three categories: policies explicitly 
aimed at influencing the volume of migrations; policies. generally adopted with 
regard to other goals, yet potentially having a significant effect on the volume 
of migration; policies designed to affect particular attributes or consequences 
of migration, 
A. Direct policies, 
The most common form of direct control on immigration is the use of entry 
visas or some equivalent such as work permits or residency certificates. Judi-
ciously applied, such requirements can regulate both composition and extent of 
immigration, In practice, the selective awarding of permits may become capricious, 
subject to bribe, or systematically discriminating against national, racial, ethnic 
or other groups. Under the laws of most countries, applicants have little recourse 
to appeal against such practices. Moreover, the adoption of visa requirements may 
serve only to push rejected or impatient applicants into illegal immigration. This 
phenomenon may in turn have secondary costs -- perhaps, for example, fostering 
criminal activity when denied access to legal jobs, 
Some countries also apply certification requirements for emigrants, as 
for example in the Soviet Bloc and in the instance of critical occupations in a 
number of LDCs, On the whole, exit restrictions seem more onerous than entry 
restrictions from a human rights stand point. This for two reasons: the denial 
of entry into one country does not necessarily imply absence of movement, whereas 
denial of exit does; but perhaps more important is the grounds for exit denial 
in many countries, being political rather than economic in nature, 
On the emigration side, as an alternative to license restriction, two 
forms of tax have been considered. In the Soviet Union an exit tax has been 
applied, to be paid at the time of emigration. If this were the only form of 
exit restriction, it would at least permit those most anxious to leave to sacrifice 
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and save sufficient funds to buy their exit permit, To the extent that emigrants 
do impose a cost on the remaini.ng group by leaving, some such tax might seem 
warranted at least from a domestic perspective. However, as Bhagwati (1972) 
points out, it is more reasonable to imagine the emigrant paying this compensa-
tion once he is actually benefiting from higher earnings abroad. Bhagwati there-
fore proposes an income tax to be imposed on (professional) emigrants from LDCs 
in their new country, the revenue to be disbursed back to the LDCs through the 
U.N. Since the potential Soviet emigrant cannot borrow funds against future 
foreign earnings to pay an exit tax, the implications of the two taxes are ob-
viously quite different. The level at which one would wish to set a Bhagwati-
type tax would depend on whether one sees this: (i) as a mechanism of redistrib-
ution within the national group; (ii) as a means of raising foreign exchange for 
the home country without regard to the net incomes of the emigrants, hence adop-
ting a domestic stance; (iii) as a measure for improving world efficiency through 
discouraging desire for emigration which the taxwill tend to do. 
B. Other policies influencing extent of migration. 
In section I, a number of causes of migration were outlined. Any policy 
bearing on these causal factors is likely to affect the magnitudes of migration 
flows, though some care must be taken in considering the interrelationships be-
tween these factors. 
For example, any policy leading to a rise in domestic wages alters rel-
ative locational wages and hence, other things equal, tends to discourage emi-
gration and encourage immigration. But at least two caveats must be placed on 
this simple view. First, an arbitrary rise in wages (perhaps through a minimum-
wage law) may serve only to deter employers from hiring, resulting in greater 
local unemployment. Since, as we noted, it is probably the "expected" wage 
which determines willingness to migrate, the rising local unemployment may dom-
inate, and the rise in domestic wages thus actually stimulate emigration and deter 
41 
immigration. Second, even though a wage raise is not offset by induced unem-
ployment (perhaps because of government hiring policy), emigration and immigra-
tion may remain unaffected. The key here is to remember that (expected) wage 
differentials tend to affect the supply of migration -- the willingness to mi-
grate. But if demand factors in the form of entry restrictions are binding, 
then a change in willingness may serve only to shorten the queue of applicants 
without altering the actual number of successful·migrants. 
A similar set of considerations apply also to policies designed to alter 
the rate of local unemployment, Here, however, an additional facet is worth 
mentioning. An effective policy of reduced unemployment may not only serve to 
reduce (increase) willingness to emigrate (immigrate) but may reduce (increase) 
the social desirability of emigration (immigration). There is an interesting 
question as to which effect is likely to proceed more rapidly. 
In so- far as unemployment during job search and lack of information 
about job opportunities are deterrents to further migration, provision of job 
locating and recruitment schemes can clearly serve to expand the flow. The Gov-
ernment of Bangladesh, for example, plays an active role in placing Bangladeshi 
nationals in jobs in the Middle East in an effort·to maintain and expand the flow. 
Any such placement program has an incentive to maintain its reputation for pro-
viding good workers when the foreign jobs offer given wages but country allot-
ments depend on worker reliability. The effect of this is for such a placement 
scheme to cream off the best of the local workers first a situation bearing 
ca_reful eva~uation. On the other side, the South African mine employers have a 
continuing program of worker recruitment in the neighboring countries in order 
to ensure (temporary) immigration of suitable workers, 
A further element listed in section I as influencing willingness to mi-
grate is the availability of funds for financing travel costs. Australia, for a 
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number of years, heavily subsidised thes,e .. costs in order to promote immigration. 
Of the workers travelling to the Middle East some must pay their own fare while 
others have the~r fare paid by the employer -- there being some variations across 
countries in this. One would expect lower wages to be paid to those having their 
fare paid by the employer, though this has the advantage for the worker of taxing 
his foreign earnings rather than requiring belt-tightening before travel. The 
sending country could instead adopt a policy of low interest loans to cover the 
air-fare, but either way society must pay iri foreign exchange. Only i~ the home 
country has empty seats on domestic planes already going to the migration destin-
ations can the country gain by lending the fare in local currency rather than al-
lowing the worker to take lower wages abroad in return for his fare. 
It was noted earlier that the educated tend to migrate more readily -- be-
cause of a change in attitude, because of greater pay differentials, 6r because 
the educated are also more wealthy. In either of the former two instances, an 
expanded rate of educational subsidization is likely to enhance the rate of emi-
gration. In the second category, this would happen because increased availability 
of educated workers at home is likely to depress their local wages and so exagger-
ate the pay differential yet further, On the other hand, if the educated migrate 
niore frequently only because they come from wealthy families and consequently can 
easily finance the trip, increased educational subsidies would have a neglibible 
outcome on the brain drain. 
Finally, for any given flow of migrants it is clearly more desirable from 
the sending country's perspective if destination wages are raised. To this end, 
it has been suggested that countries providing workers to the South African mines 
form a consortium and jointly negotiate for higher wages. But the number of workers 
migrating may not be given. If the employer is exercising monopsony power in 
labour hiring and the consortium monopoly power, then some gain in wages can be 
achieved without any reduction in hiring -- an unambiguous gain to the sending 
countries. On the other hand, if too great an increase in wages is demanded 
(perhaps because the employer can turn to alternative labor sources) then emi-
grant employment may fall. With rising wages and falling employment, total 
earnings may either rise or fall and this must be weighed against benefits and 
costs of a smaller number of out-migrants. 
C, Policies affecting certain consequences of migration. 
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Whether a domestic or national perspective is assumed, one of the major 
benefits of emigration comes through foreign exchange earned through remittances. 
Several policy alternatives exist for encouraging the rate of remittance out of 
a given level of earnings. 
First, is the possibility of offering a premium exchange rate on remittances 
as, for example, under the Wage Earners' Scheme in 'Bangladesh. Not only does such 
a policy make conversion into local currency more attractive and hence encourage 
(legal) remittance, but it also makes emigration for target-saving more attractive, 
Of course there is a cost to this policy also, for example in the form of poten-
tially higher inflation if the premium is financed out of increased money supply. 
A substantial fraction of remittances to many countries are made illegally, 
either to avoid taxation or for exchange on the black currency market. How "bad" 
this is economically, depends upon ultimate foreign exchange use and spending 
patterns of the beneficiaries under the legal and illegal alternatives, as well 
as any distributional implications. One potential policy instrument for increasing 
legal remittances, however, is compulsory deposit. Here, emigrants' employers 
agree to deposit some fraction of the worker's pay directly into a domestic bank 
for lump-sum return to the migrant upon repatriation. This may serve not only 
to increase legal remittance but also to increase overall saving, at least during 
the sojourn abroad. On the other hand, to the extent the worker would have wished 
to spend more abroad, to the extent he could have benefitted from a better ex-
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change rate or avoided taxation, this route will act to discourage emigration. 
Thirdly, the migrant workers often deposit savings abroad in a foreign 
bank delaying use of this foreign exchange by the home country, or else hoard 
it in a mattress without interest and occasionally with theft. From the home 
countries perspective, one alternative is siting of brances of domestic banks 
at convenient locations near major foreign employment centers. 
On· another theme, as we have seen in section II·, the movement of capital 
accompanying migrants can play an important role. Of course, the transfer out 
of financial capital can be and frequently is subjected to currency control 
limits -- though smuggling is also prevalento Countries of immigration can also 
encourage importation of financial capital by immigrants, as for example in the 
·u,s. where immigrants investing in the UoS. and employing UoSo workers attain a 
higher preference in applying for a visao Whether such restr.ictions and encour-
agements are beneficial from the domestic perspectives, even if successful, must 
be considered in the particular context. Except in the small country case, it 
was argued in section II that any change in the capital to labor ratios has rela-
tive price effects harmful to the domestic group. But these transfers of finan-
cial capital are also in the form of foreign exchange which is at a social prem-
ium in most countries (except such immigrant exchange-rich countries as West Ger-
many or Switzerland). 
Finally, a further attribute of emigration causing complaint and detrac-
tion is the pattern of spending out of remittances. On the whole this could be 
adjusted by taxation of remittances, but this will also serve to discourage em-
igrationo But one particular form· of ·spending presents an interesting possibility: 
as noted earlier, purchases of land by returnees represent an almost pure trans-
fer, and socially the saving behavior of the ultimate seller of land may be less 
than socially optimal. Provided the type of land being purchased by returnees 
is in fixed supply, it is quite possible to tax such land without affecting its 
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price. The outcome is no discouragement to emigration or remittance, but a trans-
fer of windfall gains from original landtord to government who may have higher a 
propensity to save. 
D. Capital and commodity movements as alternatives. 
Section III considered the evaluation of various types of migration and 
section IV has outlined some policy alternatives for stimulating, discouraging 
or altering the nature of migration decided upon. However, to place this in 
context, let us remember some of the discussion in section IL Whether seen from 
the domestic, national or global viewpoint, international migration is only one 
possibility in promoting greater efficiency. The international trade literature 
focusses on the distribution of production and trade across countries in gener-
ating efficient resource deployment. Certainly the movement of capital to workers 
rather than vice versa is a further major alternative, and one being increasingly 
chosen by several immigration countries. In evaluating migration a~d designing 
policies to align behavior with evaluation outcome, the set of alternatives to 
be considered ought to include improved trade practices and encouragement or dis-
couragement of international investment. Indeed in the end, not only must inter-
national migration be ranked along side these alternatives, but its own evalua-
tion is not independent of the adoption of such policies. 
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